

# Transient Solutions to a Two-Country Dynamic Model Considering Work Skills and Migration

WRSA 2019

Asao Ando, Tohoku University

Tomohiro Yokoyama, Tohoku Electric Power Co.

[http://www.geocities.jp/ando\\_sdj/](http://www.geocities.jp/ando_sdj/)

## Coexistence of economies with growing and stagnating populations

2

Per capita GDP (left in US\$) and Population (right in millions) for selected countries (Source: WDI)

		2000		2015		Growth rate (% p.a.)	
Middle income countries	China	954.6	1260	7924.7	1370	15.2	0.56
	Vietnam	433.3	77.6	2111.1	91.7	11.1	1.12
	Philippines	1039.7	77.9	2899.4	101	7.08	1.75
OECD countries	Spain	14787.8	40.3	25831.6	46.4	3.79	0.94
	Italy	20051.2	56.9	29847.0	60.8	2.69	0.44
	Japan	37299.6	127	32477.2	127	-0.92	0.00

Developing economies are growing with growing population.

Drastic economic growth cannot be expected for developed economies with stagnating population. → For a developed economy to make a soft landing to a new equilibrium state, relationship with developing economies is important.

[http://www.geocities.jp/ando\\_sdj/](http://www.geocities.jp/ando_sdj/)

## Existing dynamic models of economic growth<sub>3</sub>

**Solow model:** Balanced growth path with fixed per capita physical capital  $k$ .

Control the savings rate  $s$  to achieve maximum utility  $U(c)$ .

- Point economy with uniform workers.
- Dynamics is concerned with the stability of the converged equilibrium against perturbations

**Ramsey-Cass-Koopmans model:**

Optimal control to maximize the present value of future utilities

$$\max_{C(t)} U = \int_{t=0}^{\infty} e^{-\delta t} \frac{C(t)^{1-\theta}}{1-\theta} \left( \frac{L(t)}{H} \right) dt$$

$$s.t. \int_{t=0}^{\infty} e^{-R(t)} C(t) \frac{L(t)}{H} dt \leq \frac{K(0)}{H} + \int_{t=0}^{\infty} e^{-R(t)} W(t) \frac{L(t)}{H} dt$$

- Point economy, but distinct households and workers.
- Dynasty model of Infinite time horizon, but the major concern is convergence to the **steady state**.
- The dynamic path towards the optimum could include a series of **temporal disequilibria**.
- Existing dynamic models are mostly concerned about a closed economy, and cannot handle the stability with international trade. (Richard et al. 2005)

## Motives for the model

4

Economies are not always steady.

- Even if the steady state exists, the path to reach it does **not always exist**.
- To study the transient path to achieve the long-run social optimal.

**Co-existence** of population growing **South** and population declining **North**.

- The world include economies on the different stages of development.
- They interact through **trade, financial flows, and migration**.
- Significance of human capital formation through **education**.
- The new equilibrium with fewer population may be desirable; The goal of development is **not** GDP, but per capita income or individual utility.
- Search for the **region of parameters** which keep the economies sustainable throughout the planning horizon.


This study also reflects master theses by former students; Harigaya (2005) and Li (2007).

# Outline of the model

5

Households	Firms	Government
Consumption, saving, and tax payment	Production and physical investment	Human capital investment (Education)
Production and human capital		
Production	Both countries produce the same numeraire good $Y_j$	
Factors of production	Physical capital $K_j$ , Skilled workers $H_j$ , Unskilled workers $L_j$	
Skill development of workers (Education)	Unskilled workers $L_j$ can become skilled $H_j$ through education at the rate of $\Psi$ persons per annum.	
Migration of workers	Skilled workers $H_j$ can move to the country with higher per capita income at the rate of $MH$ persons per annum.	
Birth	Fertility rate $g_j$ is fixed regardless of skills. Everybody is born unskilled.	
Death	Common mortality rate $\delta_j$ applies to both $L_j$ and $H_j$ . (Markov)	
Balance of payment	ODA	FDI
Trade surplus NX is fully distributed as ODA and FDI	Deficit country allocates $\xi NX$ to education	Deficit country allocates $(1-\xi) NX$ to physical investment

# Dynamics of transactions between two economies<sub>6</sub>




Optimal control problem with finite horizon (T periods)

- The social welfare is the present value of Benthamite utilities.
- The world government problem to maximize the weighted sum of the social welfares in two countries (as the reference point).
- Search the set of parameters to reach the terminal status (existence).

# Details of instantaneous transactions

7



# The firms

8

Product	Factors of production
Numeraire ( $Y_j$ )	Physical capital ( $K_j$ ), Skilled workers ( $H_j$ ), Unskilled workers ( $L_j$ )

$$Y_j(t) = f(K_j(t), H_j(t), L_j(t))$$

$$\text{Profit } \pi_j(t) = Y_j(t) - r_j(t)K_j(t) - w_{H_j}(t)H_j(t) - w_{L_j}(t)L_j(t)$$

where  $r$  : capital rent and  $w$  : wage.  $j$  indicates the country (N or S).

First order condition for profit maximization

$$\frac{\partial f_j}{\partial K_j} = r_j(t), \frac{\partial f_j}{\partial H_j} = w_{H_j}(t), \frac{\partial f_j}{\partial L_j} = w_{L_j}(t)$$

## The workers

9

Birth	Fertility rate $g_j$ is fixed in each country (regardless of skills).
Capacity building	Unskilled worker (L) can be educated to become skilled (H). The efficiency of education $\Psi$ is a function of the government budget $G$ .
Migration	Only skilled workers are allowed to migrate to the country with higher income. The speed of migration $MH$ is a function of income difference.
Death	The mortality rate $\delta$ applies to workers (regardless of skills).

The government is specialized in education; its budget  $G_j(t)$  is financed by tax revenue and ODA.

State equations for the workers:

$$\dot{H}_j = -\delta_j H_j(t) + \Psi(G_j(t)) + MH_j(t)$$

$$\dot{L}_j = g_j(H_j(t) + L_j(t)) - \delta_j L_j(t) - \Psi(G_j(t))$$

Speed of migration for skilled workers:

$$MH_1(t) = -MH_2(t) = \eta(c_{H1}(t) - c_{H2}(t))$$

## Households (workers)

10

- Firms and physical capital are owned by the domestic workers:
- Profit  $\pi_j$  + capital rent  $r_j K_j$  are distributed to the **domestic** workers
- Skilled workers own  $\theta_j$  times as much shares than unskilled workers.
- They must give up present shares when migrating (to avoid hysteresis).

Control variables		Other endogenous variables	
Propensity to save	$s_j$	Per capita consumptions	$C_{Hj}, C_{Lj}$
Tax rate	$T_j$	Wages	$w_{Hj}, w_{Lj}$

Per capita income of skilled workers

$$y_{Hj} = \left( \frac{\theta_j (\pi_j(t) + r_j(t) K_j(t))}{(\theta_j H_j(t) + L_j(t))} + w_{Hj}(t) \right)$$

Per capita income of unskilled workers

$$y_{Lj} = \left( \frac{\pi_j(t) + r_j(t) K_j(t)}{(\theta_j H_j(t) + L_j(t))} + w_{Lj}(t) \right)$$

	$y_{Hj}^* H_j$	$y_{Lj}^* L_j$
Tax revenue $T_j$	$\tau_j$	$\tau_j$
Total saving $S_j$	$s_j(1-\tau_j)$	$s_j(1-\tau_j)$
Consumption $C_j$	$(1-s_j)(1-\tau_j)$	$(1-s_j)(1-\tau_j)$

## Balance of payments

11

Balance of payments = Trade balance + Transfer balance + Financial balance  
 =  $NX_{\text{current account}}$  -  $ODA_{\text{non-trade balance}}$  -  $FDI_{\text{non-trade balance}}$

	Behavior	Trade balance	Financial flows
Developing economies	Develop with foreign debt	-	+
Developed economies	Invest trade surplus to foreign countries	+	-

In the two-country world, one country has trade surplus, the other has deficit.

- Country with surplus → Divide the surplus to ODA and FDI to invest in the other country.
- Country with deficit → Use ODA to supplement government spending and FDI to enhance physical capital.

- The fund received by the deficit country is accumulated. (ODA includes **loan** and grant.)
- Expected to repay all the debts (principal and interest) to creditor by the terminal year.
- In the later years, the positions of surplus and deficit countries necessarily exchange.

## ODA/FDI and human/physical capital formations

12

$$NX_j(t) = \xi(t) NX_j(t) + (1 - \xi(t)) NX_j(t) \quad 0 \leq \xi_j(t) \leq 1$$

Trade surplus in N    ODA to S    FDI to S     $NX_N = -NX_S$

Government Specialized in human capital formation

$$G_j(t) = T_j(t) - \xi(t) NX_j(t)$$

Tax revenue    ODA

$$\dot{H}_j = -\delta_j H_j(t) + \Psi(G_j(t)) + MH_j(t)$$

Firms Physical capital formation in both countries

$$I_j(t) = S_j(t) - (1 - \xi(t)) NX_j(t) \rightarrow \dot{K}_j = I_j(t) - \rho_j K_j(t)$$

Savings    FDI

## Cumulative debts

13

ODA and FDI are accumulated with the fixed interest rate  $r_p$ .

### Cumulative debts as the state variables

$$A_O(t) = \int_0^t e^{-r_p t'} \xi(t') NX_j(t') dt'$$

$$A_F(t) = \int_0^t e^{-r_p t'} (1 - \xi(t')) NX_j(t') dt'$$

### State equations

$$\dot{A}_O = e^{-r_p t} \xi(t) NX_j(t)$$

$$\dot{A}_F = e^{-r_p t} (1 - \xi(t)) NX_j(t)$$

### Initial and terminal conditions

$$A_O(0) = 0, A_O(T) = 0$$

$$A_F(0) = 0, A_F(T) = 0$$

## The world government problem

14

$$\max_{s_1, s_2, \tau_1, \tau_2, \xi, NX} W = \sum_{j=1}^2 \omega_j \left\{ \int_0^T e^{-it} (u(c_{Hj}(t)) H_j(t) + u(c_{Lj}(t)) L_j(t)) dt \right\} \quad \omega: \text{weight}, i: \text{subjective discount}$$

### State equations

$$\dot{H}_j = -\delta_j H_j(t) + \Psi(G_j(t)) + M H_j(t)$$

$$\dot{L}_j = g_j(H_j(t) + L_j(t)) - \delta_j L_j(t) - \Psi(G_j(t))$$

$$\dot{K}_j = I_j(t) - \rho_j K_j(t)$$

$$\dot{A}_O = e^{-r_p t} \xi(t) NX_j(t)$$

$$\dot{A}_F = e^{-r_p t} (1 - \xi(t)) NX_j(t)$$

### Control constraints

$$0 \leq s_j \leq 1, 0 \leq \tau_j \leq 1, 0 \leq \xi_j \leq 1$$

$$G_j(t) = T_j(t) - \xi(t) NX_j(t) \geq 0$$

$$I_j(t) = S_j(t) - (1 - \xi(t)) NX_j(t) \geq 0$$

### Initial and terminal conditions

$$A_O(0) = 0, A_O(T) = 0$$

$$A_F(0) = 0, A_F(T) = 0$$

## The Hamiltonian function

15

$$\tilde{H} = e^{-it} \sum_{j=1}^2 \omega_j (u(c_{Hj}(t)) H_j(t) + u(c_{Lj}(t)) L_j(t))$$

$$+ \lambda_{11}(t) \dot{K}_1 + \lambda_{12}(t) \dot{K}_2 \quad \dot{K} : \text{Change in physical capital stock}$$

$$+ \lambda_{21}(t) \dot{H}_1 + \lambda_{22}(t) \dot{H}_2 \quad \dot{H} : \text{Change in skilled workers}$$

$$+ \lambda_{31}(t) \dot{L}_1 + \lambda_{32}(t) \dot{L}_2 \quad \dot{L} : \text{Change in unskilled workers}$$

$$+ \lambda_4(t) \dot{A}_F + \lambda_5(t) \dot{A}_O \quad \dot{A}_F : \text{Change in FDI related cumulative debts}$$

$$\dot{A}_O : \text{Change in ODA related cumulative debts}$$

## The Lagrangian function

16

$$\tilde{L} = \tilde{H}$$

$$+ \sum_{j=1}^2 \left( \begin{aligned} &\mu_{1j} (1 - s_j(t)) + \mu_{2j} (1 - \tau_j(t)) \\ &+ \mu_{4j} (s_j(t) (1 - \tau_j(t)) f(K_j(t), H_j(t), L_j(t)) - (1 - \xi(t)) NX_1(t)) \\ &+ \mu_{5j} (\tau_j(t) f(K_j(t), H_j(t), L_j(t)) - (1 - \xi(t)) NX_1(t)) \end{aligned} \right)$$

$$+ \mu_3 (1 - \xi(t))$$

With the following control constraints being considered.

$$0 \leq s_j(t) \leq 1, 0 \leq \tau_j(t) \leq 1 \rightarrow \mu_1, \mu_2$$

$$I_j(t) \geq 0, G_j(t) \geq 0 \rightarrow \mu_4, \mu_5$$

$$0 \leq \xi_j(t) \leq 1 \rightarrow \mu_3$$

### $\lambda$ : costate variables

→ marginal values of corresponding state variables

$$-\dot{\lambda}_{11} = \frac{\partial \tilde{L}}{\partial K_1}, -\dot{\lambda}_{12} = \frac{\partial \tilde{L}}{\partial K_2}$$

$$-\dot{\lambda}_{21} = \frac{\partial \tilde{L}}{\partial H_1}, -\dot{\lambda}_{22} = \frac{\partial \tilde{L}}{\partial H_2}$$

$$-\dot{\lambda}_{31} = \frac{\partial \tilde{L}}{\partial L_1}, -\dot{\lambda}_{32} = \frac{\partial \tilde{L}}{\partial L_2}$$

$$-\dot{\lambda}_4 = \frac{\partial \tilde{L}}{\partial A_F} = 0, -\dot{\lambda}_5 = \frac{\partial \tilde{L}}{\partial A_O} = 0$$

$$\lambda_{ij}(t+1) = \lambda_{ij}(t) + \dot{\lambda}_{ij}(t)$$

→ Numerically calculate the state variables in the succeeding period.

**Convergence** is judged from the value of state or costate variables in the **terminal time**.

$$\lambda_1(T) = 0, \lambda_2(T) = 0, \lambda_3(T) = 0$$

$$A_O(T) = 0, A_F(T) = 0$$

$$\lambda_4(T), \lambda_5(T) \rightarrow \text{free}$$

### Control variables

$$\frac{\partial \tilde{L}}{\partial s_j} \leq 0, \frac{\partial \tilde{L}}{\partial s_j} s_j = 0$$

$$\frac{\partial \tilde{L}}{\partial \tau_j} \leq 0, \frac{\partial \tilde{L}}{\partial \tau_j} \tau_j = 0$$

$$\frac{\partial \tilde{L}}{\partial \xi} \leq 0, \frac{\partial \tilde{L}}{\partial \xi} \xi = 0$$

$$\frac{\partial \tilde{L}}{\partial NX_1} = 0$$

### Lagrange multipliers

$$\mu_{1j}(1-s_j) = 0, \mu_{2j}(1-\tau_j) = 0,$$

$$\mu_3(1-\xi) = 0, \mu_4 I_j = 0, \mu_5 E_j = 0$$

$$\mu_{1j} \geq 0, \mu_{2j} \geq 0, \mu_3 \geq 0, \mu_4 \geq 0, \mu_5 \geq 0,$$

$$\mu_{ij} = 0 \text{ when internal solution is assumed.}$$

→ Control variables can be solved numerically.

# Specifications for numerical analysis

### Production function

$$Y_1(t) = K_1(t)^{\alpha_1} H_1(t)^{\alpha_2} L_1(t)^{\alpha_3}$$

$$Y_2(t) = K_2(t)^{\alpha_1} H_2(t)^{\alpha_2} L_2(t)^{\alpha_3}$$

Both countries share the same Cobb-Douglas function.

Parameter  $\alpha$  satisfies  $\sum \alpha = 1$  (Linearly homogeneous)

### Utility function

$$u(c_{Hj}(t)) = \ln(c_{Hj}(t))$$

$$u(c_{Lj}(t)) = \ln(c_{Lj}(t))$$

### Efficiency of education


$$\Psi(G_j(t)) = \varepsilon \ln(G_j(t) + 1)$$

### Terminal conditions

$$A_O(T) = 0, A_F(T) = 0$$

$$\lambda_1(T) = 0, \lambda_2(T) = 0, \lambda_3(T) = 0 \quad \lambda_4(T), \lambda_5(T) \rightarrow \text{free}$$

# Outline of the iterative solution procedure



Terminal year=100

# List of alternative values of parameters

Variable	North	South	# Cases
Production function	$(\alpha_1, \alpha_2, \alpha_3) = (0.4, 0.35, 0.25), (0.5, 0.3, 0.2), (0.6, 0.3, 0.1)$		3
Speed of migration	0.5, 1.0, 1.5		3
Capital depreciation	0.04, 0.08, 0.12	0.035, 0.07, 0.105	9
Efficiency of education	0.25, 0.5, 0.75		3
Fertility rate	0.0071, 0.0142, 0.0213	0.0223, 0.0446, 0.0669	81
Mortality rate	0.01305, 0.00435, 0.0087	0.0083, 0.0166, 0.0249	
Weight of welfare	1.0	0.45, 0.9, 1.35	3
Subjective discount	0.01, 0.02, 0.03		3
Interest rate	0.01, 0.02, 0.03		3
Asset share of skilled	0.6, 1.2, 1.8	0.75, 1.5, 2.25	9
Initial values	$K_1(0)=1200, H_1(0)=40, L_1(0)=75$	$K_2(0)=90, H_2(0)=20, L_2(0)=100$	



- Each parameter is assigned three values, and those in red represent the standard case.
- Standard values of capital depreciation, fertility, and mortality rates are based on the observed data.
- When one parameter is diverted from the standard case at a time, the sum of 117 cases are generated.

# Cases reached convergence

Case	Fertility rate	Mortality rate	L(0) in North
1	0.0142	0.0223	
2	0.0071	0.0223	100
3	0.0071	0.0223	110
4	Speed of migration $\eta=0.5$		
5	Interest rate $r_p=0.03$		

- In cases 2 and 3, the initial unskilled workers in North are modified to the values comparable to those in South in order to reach the solution.
- In practice, it is not possible to change the number of existing workers.
- The current calculations do not consider the terminal conditions concerning the cumulative debts.
- Even though, only cases 1, 4, and 5 are deemed solvable besides the standard case, under the present numerical procedure.



# Comparative dynamics: Decrease in mortality rate in the North (Case 1)



Production: Increases in both countries  
 Physical investment: Increases in both countries  
 Education spending: Similar to the standard case

Decrease in death in the North will contribute to production increase, which would expand the fund for physical investment (in both countries).


# Comparative dynamics: Decrease in mortality rate in the North (Case 1)



- Both skilled and unskilled workers increase in both countries.
- Migrants from North to South will decrease.
- Skilled workers will increase despite unchanged educational spending.


## Comparative dynamics: Decrease in the speed of migration (Case 4)

25




## Comparative dynamics: Decrease in the speed of migration (Case 4)

26




## Comparative dynamics: Increase in interest rate (Case 5)

27



## Comparative dynamics: Increase in interest rate (Case 5)

28



An optimal control problem for the world comprising two countries and considering two types of workers is formulated.

### Research questions:

- How the population declining country can coexist with the population increasing country?
- Is it possible for the former to survive with debt services from the latter?

### Model simplifications:

- A dynasty model; birth and death are considered, but they occur as a Markov process, regardless of age. → OLG setting is an alternative.
- Workers hold only domestic shares to avoid migration hysteresis problem.
- No uncertainty, which is important in international financial obligations, is considered.
- The *world government problem* is the simplest way to solve this kind of problems, but the solutions can serve as the reference to other (less efficient) solution procedures; e.g. class of dynamic games.

Numerical analyses seem only practical approach to the model; Iterative solution procedure is developed.

### Find sets of parameters with which the admissible path exist:

- Model includes 8 parameters, such as the fertility/mortality rates, which must be specified for each country, and 6 parameters, such as interest and subjective discount rates, which are common to both countries.
- In this study, a sum of 117 cases, each of which reflects alteration of one or two parameters from the standard case, are tested.
- Only three of them can be solved, but still difficult to meet the terminal condition of paying off previous debts.

### The transient solutions seem to exist for fairly limited sets of parameters.

- The numerical procedure must be reviewed to reduce the non-solvable case caused by technical reason. → Use of GAMS?
- Extensive tests must be conducted to find the region of parameters, for which the population declining economy becomes sustainable.